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Preface
The aim of my study has been to review models for credit contagion finalizing
the study to the computation of derivative prices. Credit contagion is a fairly new
field to be studied. Kusuoka introduced a way to model dependent defaults in 1998
and Davis and Lo, [4], introduced a model for default contagion in 2001. Credit
contagion is an element of credit risk. Credit risk consists of individual risk ele-
ments, such as default probability and recovery rates, and it consists of portfolio
risk elements like default correlation. There are roughly two approaches to model
credit risk; structural modeling and intensity based modeling. The structural mod-
els (also called firm value models) goes back to Merton. In these models, default is
triggered when the value process (which might be modeled by a standard geometric
Brownian motion) of a firm falls below a pre-determined default boundary. In the
intensity based models (also known as reduced form models) default is typically
described as a jump time of a jump process (for instance a Poisson process).
Default is, as mentioned, an element of credit risk. Modeling credit risk is im-
portaint when it comes to the modeling of derivative pricing, such as the prices
of credit default swaps, (CDS), and collateral debt obligations, (CDO), which are
basic protection contracts against default of firms in a portfolio. CDS’ and CDOs
have been largely talked about during the latest financial crisis since, among oth-
ers, credit rating agencies (which evaluate the default probability of issuers of debt
securities) failed to adequately account for large risks when rating these products.
Credit rating agencies, like Moody’s and Credit Suisse, calculate the default likeli-
hood of firms. To model correlations between the default behavior of firms, Credit
Suisse uses the correlations in equity values as a replacement for the correlations
in the default probabilities (also known as correlations in credit quality). Moody’s
uses the ’diversity score’ which is based on the binomial expansion technique,
where independence between firms is assumed. Moody’s idea on how to capture
correlations in a binomial distribution is to make a hypothetical portfolio consisting
of less firms than the original one, and having the hypothetical firms being inde-
pendent. Then a default in the ’new’ portfolio would correspond to, say, 2 defaults
in the original portfolio. Other ways to model default and credit contagion might
be to introduce primary and secondary firms, as in the approach of Jarrow and Yu,
referred to in [6]. In the model by Jarrow and Yu the defaults of the primary firms
are influenced by macoreconomic conditions (i.e. influenced by the gross domestic
product, unemployment rate and inflation rate), but not by the credit risk of coun-
terparties. The default of the secondary firm depends on the status of other firms,
so it suffices to focus on securities issued by secondary firms. Kusuoka’s approach
to model default dependence, which is also referred to in [6], is based on a change
of probability measure. Kusuoka assumed that the default times were exponen-
tially distributed. The probability measure is then changed so that the parameter
of the exponential law belonging to one firm will jump to a pre-determined value
as soon as the default of another firm occurs. Yet another approach is the one by
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Davis and Lo, [4]. They model default in a portfolio by independent Bernoulli vari-
ables where default can occur due to direct default of a company or by contagion.
The model suggested by Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg is based on the one by
Davis and Lo.
My studies of the modeling of credit contagion and pricing of derivatives are based
on the papers of Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg [2] and of Hatchett and Kühn
[3]. The paper is organized as follows: First I will give a short introduction to
contagion and default, as well as a general calculation of derivative prices. In
chapter 2 I will describe the default intensities for the discrete time model as in
[3]. In chapter 3 the continuous time model will be described as in [2]. I will
also compare some elements of the two models. The pricing of derivatives will be
presented in the two chapters where the model description is taking place. Finally,
I will present an extention of the continuous time contagion description in chapter
4. This extension consists in expanding the economic relationship between firms
from not just being present or absent, but to try to say how much they can influence
each other economically if they are in an economic relationship. This means that
the extension is trying to describe which type of economic relationship the firms
are in - a competitive or cooperative economic relationship.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Credit contagion arises when a company is in economic distress or if it defaults.
The default of a company will have implications for any firm that is economically
connected to this given company. The effect of the default, and thus the effect of
the credit contagion, depends on which economic relation the defaulting company
has with other firms. If they were in a cooperative relationship, the default would
have a negative effect on the firms that are connected to the defaulting company.
For instance, if a company goes bankrupt, it will have a negative effect on the credit
situation of its service provider or on its bank connection. On the other hand, if they
were in a competitive economic relation, the default would have a positive effect
on the firms that are connected to the defaulting company. For example, if there
is a default within a business section, the number of orders might increase for the
surviving firms.
One of the main worries when investing in a portfolio consisting of defaultable
bonds is to not recieve the promised payment at the date of maturity, and this may
occur if a bond defaults. If one bond defaults, there might be the risk of default
contagion resulting in several defaults within the portfolio. Hence, the loss will be
even larger. This is one of the reasons why one is interested in credit contagion.
1.1 Intensity based default
Default in an intensity based model is specified in terms of a jump process, and the
jump occurs at time τ which is typically modeled as a jump time of a jump process.
What drives contagion are the default intensities of the firms within the portfolio.
The default probability is the probability that the obligor or counterparty will de-
fault on its contractual obligations to repay its debt, [5]. Denote the random time
of default by τ : Ω → R+ which is defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P). τ is
assumed to be unbounded and non-negative. Let F = (Ft)t≥0. Further, consider
the filtration G = (Gt)t≥0, where, for any t, Gt is some given σ-algebra which con-
tains all the null sets of Ft and is right-continuous on the given probability space
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with Ft ⊂ Gt.
1.1.1 Definitions regarding default
Default in an intensity based model is regarded as a stopping time with respect to
a given filtration, and one has to consider the two different cases of continuous or
discrete time. Starting with the definition for a discrete time model.
Definition (Stopping time in discrete time) An F-stopping time on (Ω,F ,P) is a
random variable τ : Ω→ N ∪ { ∞} such that { ω ∈ Ω : τ(ω) = n} is in Fn for
all n in N.
The definition of the default time for a continuous time model is as follows:
Definition (Stopping time in continuous time) An F-stopping time on (Ω,F ,P)
is a random variable τ : Ω → [0,∞] such that { ω ∈ Ω : τ(ω) ≤ t} is in Ft for
all t in [0,T].
Let F be the cumulative distribution function of τ , then F (t) = P(τ ≤ t) for ev-
ery t in R+ is the default probability, and 1 − F (t) = P(τ > t) is the survival
probability. If P(τ ∈ (0,∞)) > 0 the stopping time is non-trivial. The following
definition is from [6].
Definition (Hazard and intensity function) An increasing function
Γ : R+ → R+ given by the formula
Γ(t) := −ln(1− F (t)) for all t in R+,
is called the hazard function of τ . If the cumulative distribution function F is
absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure - that is, when F (t) =∫ t
0 f(u)du, for a Lebesgue integrable function f : R
+ → R+, then
F (t) = 1− e−Γ(t) = 1− e−
∫ t
0 γ(u)du,
where γ(t) = f(t)(1−F (t))−1. The function γ is called the intensity function (or
the hazard rate) of the random time τ .
By assuming that F (t) < 1, the hazard function Γt is well defined for any t in
R+ since the function f is positive and the cumulative distribution function also is
positive, the intensity function γ is non-negative.
In order to give some examples of the different types of default intensities, one has
to define some processes. Remember that a counting process N is defined through
an increasing sequence { T0, T1, . . .} of random variables, or random times, in
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[0,∞]. The process N is called non-explosive if limn Tn = +∞ almost surely. Re-
call as well that a random variable X with outcomes { 0, 1, 2, . . .} is Poisson dis-
tributed with parameter λ in (0,∞), written X ∼ Po(λ), if P(X = x) = λx
x! e
−λ
where 0! = 1. The following definitions are from [7].
Definition (Poisson Process) A Poisson process is a G-adapted non-explosive count-
ing process N with deterministic intensity λ > 0 such that
∫ t
0 λsds is finite dt-
almost everywhere for all t, with the property that, for all t and s > t, conditional
on Gt, the random variable (Ns −Nt) ∼ Po(
∫ s
t
λudu).
The filtration (Gt)t≥0 has been fixed in advance for the purpose of the definitions.
Alternatively, for s > t, one can say, since the increment (Ns−Nt) is independent
of the σ-field σ(Nu : u ≤ t), that P
(
(Ns−Nt) = k|Gt
)
= P
(
(Ns−Nt) = k
)
=
(λ(s−t))k
k! e
−λ(s−t)
.
Definition (Doubly Stochastic Process) Let N be a G-adapted non-explosive count-
ing process with intensity λ > 0. N is doubly stochastic, driven by F, if λ is F-
predictable and if, for all t and s > t, conditional on the filtration Gt ∨ Fs,
(Ns − Nt) ∼ Po(
∫ s
t
λ(ω, u))du. A doubly stochastic process is also called a
Cox process.
The intuition behind a doubly stochastic counting process is thatFt contains enough
information to uncover the default intensity λt, but not information to uncover the
jump times of the counting process.
1.1.2 Some examples of default intensities
This thesis is not considering structural modeling, but just to have it mentioned:
In the basic Merton model of default, τ happens when the value of the firm at the
time of maturity, T, falls below the face value of the bond. Thus, default is only
possible at T. And in the model of Black and Cox, τ is modeled as a first pas-
sage time in which default happens when the value process of the firm reaches the
level of its debt for the first time. In these kinds of models default is economic
motivated. In the intensity based models defaults happen when an intensity based
process makes a jump. One can mention three types of default intensities: constant-
, deterministic- and stochastic default intensities.
In the three following cases, let τ be exponentially distributed with intensity pa-
rameter λ and τ := inf{ t > 0 : Nt = 1} , where Nt is a Poisson process. This
means that the time of default can be seen as the time of the first jump of Nt.
In a model where the default intensity is constant, the default probability is
P(τ ≤ t) = 1 − e−λt. The intensity function is γ(t) = λ for all t in R+ and it
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is constant for all t. A Poisson process with constant intensity λ > 0 is called a
time-homogeneous Poisson process.
If one has a deterministic default intensity, then Nt ∼ Po(
∫ t
0 λudu). The de-
fault probability would be P(τ ≤ t) = 1 − e−
∫ t
0 λudu. The intensity function is
γ(t) = λ(t) and it varies with the time t. A Poisson process with deterministic
intensity λ > 0 is called a time-inhomogeneous Poisson process.
When one has the case of stochastic default intensity, Nt is a doubly stochastic
process which is Poisson distributed with parameter
∫ t
0 λ(ω, u)du. The parameter
of the exponential distribution is λ(ω, u), and τ is a G-stopping time. Both the
intensity and the stopping time are stochastic, and this is why a Cox process is
sometimes called a doubly stochastic Poisson process. The general probability of
default would be, for t ≤ s,
P(t < τ ≤ s|Gt) = E(1− e−
∫ s
t
λ(ω,u)du|Gt).
And for t = 0, the default probability becomes
P(τ ≤ s) = E(1− e−
∫ s
0 λ(ω,u)du).
The expectations are under P. In these two cases the intensity function is γ(s) =
λ(ω, s). The two expressions can be evaluated by the same means as in calculating
the price of a default free zero coupon bond (a contract paying one unit of currency
at the time of maturity), by letting λt be the short term interest rate, rt, and solve
the stochastic differential equation by, for instance, the Vasicek or CIR models. As
an illustration one can consider the short term interest rate to be the instantaneous
spot rate and the bank account to grow at each time instant t at a rate of rt. One
can look, for example, at the fundamental pricing formula, found in [12]:
The price of an attainable contingent claim with payoff HT at time T > t is given
by
Vt = EQ(e
− ∫ T
t
rsdsHT |Ft) (1.1)
where the risk neutral measure Q ∼ P is assumed to exist. Before moving on with
the calculations, one can recall the meaning of an attainable claim:
A contingent claim is an FT -measurable random variable F in L2(Q). The contin-
gent claim F is attainable on the given market model if there exists an admissible
portfolio Z such that the value process of the portfolio at time T is V Zy (T ) = F
where y = V Z(0). The portfolio Z is admissible if it is self-financing and lower
bounded, V Zt ≥ −K, K > 0 for all t P-almost surely. By self-financing one means
that dV Zt = Zt · dXt where Xt(i) is the price of security i at time t, and the value
process has to be integrable.
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Moving on with the calculations of equation ( 1.1), let the short rate rt be the the
intensity function λt and HT = 1 as the face value of the zero coupon bond. By ap-
plying the Vasicek model, the dynamics of λt is given by the stochastic differential
equation
dλt = a(b− λt)dt+ σdBt (1.2)
where a,b and σ are positive constants. (The CIR model is similar to the expres-
sion in equation ( 1.2), but where the term σdBt = σ
√
λtdBt). Bt is a standard
one-dimensional Brownian motion generating Ft. Note that F coinsides with the
filtration generated by λt. By letting Xt = −(b − λt) one gets that ( 1.2) can be
written as {
dXt = −aXtdt+ σdBt
X0 = λ0 − b
which is an Ohrnstein-Uhlenbeck process, and it is an affine process which means
that it is Markovian and that there exists an explicit expression for ( 1.1). The
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is solved by applying Itô’s formula with integrating
factor eat, so
d(Xte
at) = aeatXtdt+ e
at(−aXt + σdBt)
and by integrating from s to t and dividing by the integrating factor one gets
Xt = Xse
−a(t−s) + e−at
∫ t
s
σeaudBu, s ≤ t.
By substituting Xt = −(b− λt), the answer to equation ( 1.2) is
λt = λse
−a(t−s) + b(1− e−a(t−s)) + σ
∫ t
s
e−a(t−u)dBu. (1.3)
The process λt is Gaussian. By looking at E(λt|Fs) and V ar(λt|Fs), one finds
that
λt ∼ N
(
λse
−a(t−s) + b(1− e−a(t−s)), σ22a (1− e−2a(t−s))
)
. By looking at
limt→∞ E(λt) = b, one can regard b as a long term average intensity.
The dynamics for λt is under P. In order to use the pricing formula given in equa-
tion ( 1.1), one has to find the dynamics for the intensity λt under the measure Q.
By Girsanov Theorem (theorem 8.6.6 in [13]) one gets that B˜t = Bt +
∫ t
0 qds,
where q is in R and q = a(b−λt)−α
σ
. Notice that q depends on t through λt, but
Vasicek assumed that the instantaneous spot rate (which is now λt) under the mea-
sure P evolves as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with constant coefficients. By
the given choice of q it is also assumed that the coefficients are constant under Q
as well. The dynamics in equation ( 1.2) becomes
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dλt = a(b− λt)dt+ σdBt under P
dλt = a(b− σq
a
)dt− aλtdt+ σdB˜t under Q.
The last equality could be stated as αtdt+ σdB˜t, but in this case let (b− σqa ) = b˜.
Then X˜t = λt − b˜ implies that
dX˜t = −aX˜tdt+ σdB˜t. (1.4)
This is an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process under the measure Q as well, so it is Gaus-
sian with continuous paths. For HT = 1, the pricing formula given in equation
( 1.1) can be written as
Vt = EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
λsds|Ft
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
X˜s+b˜ ds|Ft
)
= e−
∫ T
t
b˜ dsEQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
X˜sds|Ft
)
. (1.5)
Since the coefficients in the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck equation are time-independent,
one can write
EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
X˜sds|Ft
)
= F (T − t, X˜t) (1.6)
where F is the function defined by F (θ, x) = EQ(e−
∫ θ
0 X˜
x
s ds) and X˜xs is the unique
solution of equation ( 1.4) satisfying X˜x0 = x. In this case x = λ0− b˜ and X˜xs will
just be written X˜s. Recall that the Laplace transformation of a random variable,
for u in R, is E(euX) =
∫
R
euxPX(dx). The expectation is calculated by Laplace
transformation of a Gaussian random varibale:
EQ
(
e−
∫ θ
0 X˜sds
)
= e
(
−EQ(
∫ θ
0 X˜sds)+
1
2
V arQ(
∫ θ
0 X˜s)ds
)
.
The expectation becomes, where the first equality is due to Fubini’s,
EQ(
∫ θ
0
X˜sds) =
∫ θ
0
EQ(λs − b˜)ds
=
∫ θ
0
EQ(λ0e
−a(s) + b˜(1− e−a(s)) + σ
∫ s
0
e−a(s−u)dBu − b˜)ds
= (
λ0 − b˜
a
)(1− e−aθ). (1.7)
To calculate V arQ(
∫ θ
0 X˜sds) one starts out with writing the variance as the covari-
ance. Recall that for two random variables X and Y with expectation µX and µY ,
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respectively, the covariance is defined as Cov(X,Y ) = E
(
(X − µX)(Y − µY )
)
.
Then
V arQ(
∫ θ
0
X˜sds) =
∫ θ
0
∫ θ
0
Cov(X˜t, X˜u)du dt
=
∫ θ
0
∫ θ
0
(1{ t>u} + 1{ t≤u} )Cov(X˜t, X˜u)du dt. (1.8)
Looking at the expression for the covariance without the integrals and putting X˜t =
λt − b˜ and by using the expression given in equation ( 1.3) , for s = 0, one gets
Cov(X˜t, X˜u) =
EQ
((
λ0e
−at+ b˜(1− e−at)+σ
∫ t
0
e−a(t−s)dBs− b˜− (λ0e−at+ b˜(1− e−at)− b˜)
)
×(λ0e−au+ b˜(1−e−au)+σ ∫ t
0
e−a(u−s)dBs− b˜− (λ0e−au+ b˜(1−e−au)− b˜)
))
= EQ
(
(σe−at
∫ t
0
easdBs)(σe
−au
∫ u
0
easdBs)
)
= σ2e−a(t−u)
∫ t∧u
0
e2asds
= σ2e−a(t−u)
(e2a(t∧u) − 1)
2a
.
Inserting this answer into equation ( 1.8), one is left with calculating∫ θ
0
∫ θ
0
σ2e−a(t−u)
(e2a(t∧u) − 1)
2a
dudt
=
σ2
2a
∫ θ
0
(∫ u
0
e−at−au+2at − e−at−audt
)
du
+
σ2
2a
∫ θ
0
(∫ t
0
e−at−au+2at − e−at−audu
)
dt
=
σ2θ
a2
− σ
2
a3
(1− e−aθ)− σ
2
2a3
(1− e−aθ)2. (1.9)
Finally, by putting together the expressions for the expectation in equation ( 1.7)
and the variance in equation ( 1.9), and by using equation ( 1.6), one gets that the
pricing formula in equation ( 1.5) becomes:
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exp{ −b˜(T − t)− (λ0 − b˜
a
)(1− e−a(T−t))}
×exp{ 1
2
(σ2(T − t)
a2
− σ
2
a3
(1− e−a(T−t))− σ
2
2a3
(1− e−a(T−t))2
)
}
which is more frequently expressed as
P (t, T ) = e−(T−t)R(T−t,λt), (1.10)
which is the affine structure mentioned previously, and where R(T − t, λt) is given
by
R(θ, λ) = (b˜− σ
2
2a2
)− 1
aθ
(
(b˜− σ
2
2a2
− λ)(1− e−aθ)− σ
2
4a2
(1− e−aθ)2
)
.
If the model for λt is under the measure P, historical data should be used to estimate
the drift and volatility. If the model is under the measure Q, the risk adjusted
drift and volatility can only be inferred from existing prices. One drawback of the
Vasicek model is if b = λt, then the dynamics become dλt = σdBt and one has
a random walk. The Brownian component can take positive and negative values,
so the intensity λt might be negative, and default intensities are supposed to be
positive . In the CIR model the default intenstiy will not become negative, but the
process is not Gaussian and explicit formulae are more difficult to come by.
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Chapter 2
Contagion model in discrete time
The paper of Hatchett and Kühn, [3], describes credit contagion in a discrete time
framework. They are using probability theory to express their findings. The results
are based on the use of the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem.
In order to use the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem the
random variables (the firms) has to be independent and identically distributed, and
the number of firms, m, has to tend to infinity. The firms and their enviroment
within the portfolio are assumed to be fairly homogeneous, so the firms are thus
assumed to be similar to each other or of the same type. The only possible states
for the firms are solvent or defaulted. They describe the default process Zt(i)
by a discrete time Markov chain where the probability of default of firm i in a
given time step depends on the state of its economic partners at the beginning of
that given time period, as well as on the macroeconomic interference. The time
period [0, T ] = { 0, 1, . . . , T} describes a one year range. It is assumed that
the defaulting state is absorbing and that there is one single macroeconomic factor
which is constant over the time period of one year. Hatchett and Kühn did not
consider pricing in their paper, so in section 2.4 there will be given some examples
of pricing by using their default intensity.
2.1 The framework
Let the number of firms m → ∞. For i in { 1, 2, . . . ,m} the default process of
the portfolio is denoted by Zt(i) for t = 0, . . . , T and is described by a binary
indicator variable, meaning
Zt(i) =
{
0 firm i is solvent at time t,
1 firm i has defaulted at time t by itself.
The default process is a Markov chain and it evolves accordingly:
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{
Zt+1(i) = Zt(i) + (1− Zt(i))1{ Wt(i)<0} ,
Z0(i) = 0
(2.1)
The Zt(i) are functions of the wealth, which is stochastic. It is assumed that a firm
defaults when its wealth falls below zero. The wealth process, Wt(i), is the value
of the total wealth of firm i at time t and it is given by
{
Wt(i) = ϑi −
∑m
j=1CijZt(j)− ηt(i) t = 1, 2, . . . , T
W0(i) = ϑi > 0
(2.2)
The constant ϑi is the initial wealth of firm i at time t = 0. Note that the initial
wealth ϑi does not depend on time, so the model does not say anything about how
firm i is making or loosing money in each time epoch. By letting the wealth pro-
cess Wt(i) depend on t and not on t+ 1, i.e. not Wt+1(i), means that the possible
effect of credit contagion does not happen immediately. This means that the default
process can have its first default state at Z2(i). If the wealth process was depend-
ing on t + 1, i.e. Wt+1(i), then any default contagion effect would influence the
portfolio default process immediately.
The matrix Cij describes the credit contagion relation of firm i and j, so for firm
i 6= j in { 1, . . . ,m} one has

Cij > 0 firm i and j in a cooperative economic relation
Cij = 0 firm i and j independent
Cij < 0 firm i and j in a competitive economic relation.
The case Cii = 0. If company j defaults and Cij > 0 it means that the two firms
had a cooperative credit relation, and the default of j would contribute to a decrease
in the wealth of firm i. If Cij < 0, then j and i had a competitive relation and Wt(i)
would increase due to the default of firm j. The case Cij = 0 means that the firms
are not in an economic relation at all. Further description of the contagion term Cij
will be given in section 2.2.
The fluctuating forces disturbing the wealth process of a company given in equation
( 2.2) is the random variable ηt(i) ∼ N (0, σ2i ), and it is decomposed into a term
describing individual fluctuations (for instance, extremely productive employees
or defect production equipments) and another term describing the macroeconomic
factor, which is one dimensional. In other words,
18
ηt(i) = σi(
√
ρiη0 +
√
1− ρiξt(i)). (2.3)
Here, σi is a scaling parameter. The random variables ξt(i) ∼ N (0, 1) are indepen-
dent and they describe the individual fluctuations of firm i. The macroeconomic
factor is described by η0 ∼ N (0, 1), but it is assumed to be constant over the time
horizon of one year in this model. The information of η0 is known at time t = 0,
so η0 is treated as a known constant element of the model.
In choosing the correlations of ηt(i) and ηt(j), Hatchett and Kühn followed the
prescription given by BASEL II (which are recomondations on banking laws and
regulations) which sets
ρi ≈ 0.12(1 + e−50PDi), (2.4)
where PDi is the probability of self default of firm i over one year, ignoring credit
contagion effects. (More on PDi is found in section 2.3.)
2.2 The contagion model
The contagion quantities Cij which describe the loss or gain of firm i caused by
the default of firm j are given by
Cij = cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
, (2.5)
where the random variables xij ∼ N (0, 1) are assumed to be pairwise indepen-
dent. The cij are randomly fixed in the sence that the way to assign the value of
cij is according to a random generator. The cij are fixed numbers that are either 0
or 1, and they describe the absence or presence of a business connection between
firm i and j. The cij has a probability distribution given by
P(cij ∈ { 0, 1} ) = c
m
δcij (1) + (1−
c
m
)δcij (0), cij = cji,
where the cij is in { 0, 1} and
δcij (1) =
{
1 , cij = 1
0 , cij = 0.
The quantity (C0
c
+ C√
c
xij) ∼ N (Coc , C
2
c
) by linear transformation (see appendix A).
It gives the size of the contagion strength and the size is not symmetric. This can
be understood by the following example, which is from [8]: Let there be one
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small supplier with one large company taking the majority of its orders. If the
larger company defaults then the small supplier may default as well. However, if
the small supplier defaults then the larger company is less likely to suffer terminal
distress. The number c is the average number of connections that a firm has, and
the connections are symmetric, i.e. cij = cji. They also satisfy transitivity, i.e.
cihchj ≤ cij or even some bigger loop. The value c is assumed to be large.
It it assumed that Zt(i),
∑
j CijZt(j) and ξt(i) (appearing in equation ( 2.3)) are
uncorrelated. The parameters C0 and C determine the mean and variance of Cij ,
which means that if C0 > 0 the firms are not independent on average. For future
calculations, one needs the distribution of
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j). (2.6)
The number cij in { 0, 1} is known in advance. The C0c + C√c are numbers as
well, so the only randomness in the expression in ( 2.6) is from xij , which are
Gaussian with finite moments, and from Zt(j). Through equation ( 2.1) one sees
that the Zt(i) are correlated, but Hatchett and Kühn argue that the Zt(i) are suffi-
ciently weakly correlated for the limit theorems to be applied. The contributions to∑m
j=1CijZt(j) are sufficiently weakly correlated because:
There are two ways that the neighbor firms of i can be correlated through the dy-
namics. Either through firm i or through some other loop, i.e. one can have Chi
and Cij so firm h and j are correlated through firm i or one can have Chℓ and Cℓj
so firm h and j are not correlated through firm i. However, as long as Zt(i) = 0,
Zt(h) and Zt(j) can not influence each other through firm i. But when Zt(i) = 1,
the correlation firm i induces on h and j are irrelevant for its own dynamics, i.e.
for the dynamics of firm i.
By assumption, both the average connectivity c, which was assumed to be large,
and the number of firms m → ∞, and c/m → 0 with c = O(log(m)), which
means that c goes more slowly to ∞ than m does. The variables (C0
c
+ C√
c
xij)
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.). The default process is a binary
indicator variable taking the value 0 or 1. To find the distribution of the sum in
( 2.6), exploit the fact that (C0
c
+ C√
c
xij) and Zt(j) are independent. Hatchett and
Kühn treats the sum in ( 2.6) as a sum of Gaussian variables. This is seen form the
way the find the distributin of the sum.
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j) =
m∑
j=1
cij
C0
c
Zt(j) +
m∑
j=1
cij
( C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j).
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They apply the Law of Large Numbers (appendix A) to the first sum, and using
c = cm →∞
m∑
j=1
cij
C0
c
Zt(j)
P−→ C0E(Zt(j)).
This is only valid if the Zt(j) are i.i.d., and if so E(Zt(j)) = E(Zt(1)). Since
xij ∼ N (0, 1), the expectation of the second part in the sum is zero. By using
that V ar(X) = E(X2) − (E(X))2 for a random variable X , and the Continuity
Theorem (appendix A), since f(u) = u2 is a continuous function, then
m∑
j=1
(cij
( C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j))
2 P−→ C2V ar(cijZt(j))
as c = cm →∞. Again, the variables have to i.i.d. If so, then C2V ar(cijZt(j)) =
C2(E(Zt(1)))
2
. Then they use the Central Limit Theorem to find the asymptotic
distribution of the sum in ( 2.6) and finds that
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j)
L−→ N (C0E(Zt(1)), C2(E(Zt(1)))2).
Alternatively, one could argue that the Zt(j) are random variables taking the value
0 or 1 where the randomness comes from the underlying stochastic wealth pro-
cess Wt(j) which is Gaussian, thus the Zt(j) are Gaussian as well. They are
independent of xij . The expectation of each element in the sum becomes, due to
independence,
E(cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j)) =
C0
c
E(cijZt(j)),
and the variance
V ar(cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j)) =
C2
c
V ar(cijZt(j)).
Use linear transformation on the Gaussian sum and obtain that the distribution of
the sum in ( 2.6)
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m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j) ∼ N
(C0
c
m∑
j=1
E(cijZt(j)),
C2
c
m∑
j=1
V ar(cijZt(j)
)
.
(2.7)
Let this be the distribution for the sum for future calculations.
2.3 The default intensities
The description of the default model is as seen from a structural point of view since
default happens when the wealth process Wt(i) < 0. The starting point in an inten-
sity based model is the modeling of the intensity process. The basic idea behind an
intensity based model is that there are two states, solvent or defaulted. By letting
Zt(i) be the state at time t of firm i and λt(i) the transition intensity from solvent
to default, then the transition intensity is interpreted as the probability of Zt going
from solvent to default in a short time interval.
Starting out with the very general case first, the variable ηt(i) is now assumed to
be standard normal. In order to find the default intensity in this model for the very
general case, one has to look at
P
(
Zt+1(i) = 1
∣∣∣Zt(i) = 0, m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)
)
= P
(
1{ Wt(i)<0} = 1
∣∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)
)
= P
(
Wt(i) < 0
∣∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)
)
= P
(
ηt(i) > ϑi −
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)
∣∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)
)
= Φ(y − ϑi)
∣∣∣
y=
∑m
j=1 CijZt(j)
. (2.8)
The function Φ(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function of the standard nor-
mal density. This is then the general default intensity of Zt(i) where default can
occure due to both self default or default by contagion, i.e. λt(i) = Φ(y − ϑi).
One can interpret the variables ϑi and Cij in terms of the default probabilities. Let
the default probability without contagion of firm i be denoted by pi, so pi is the self
default probability and
∑m
j=1CijZt(j) = 0. Then
pi = P(Wt(i) < 0
∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0) = Φ(−ϑi) (2.9)
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and the initial wealth of firm i can be expressed as ϑi = −Φ−1(pi). With pi
as the monthly default probability, then PDi in equation ( 2.3) is approximately
12Φ(−ϑi).
On the other hand, the expected default of firm i given that only one firm, say, j has
defaulted would be
pi|j = P(Wt(i) < 0
∣∣CijZt(j) = 1) = Φ(Cij − ϑi).
This leads to the following expression of the contagion term:
Φ−1(pi|j) = Cij +Φ−1(pi)
⇐⇒
Cij = Φ
−1(pi|j) + Φ−1(pi).
By moving on to the less general case where one uses the expression for ηt(i) as
given in equation ( 2.3), so ηt(i) = σi(√ρiη0 +
√
1− ρiξt(i)), one can start de-
scribing the default intensities in the cases of independent firms and firms exposed
to credit contagion.
2.3.1 Independent default intensity
The following default models are for one time epoch, i.e. for t in [t,t+1]. The first
focus is on the case where the firms are independent, Cij = 0 for all i and j, so firm
i is thus not in an economic relation with any other fimrs.
P(Zt+1(i) = 1|Zt(i) = 0,
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0)
= P(1{ Wt(i)<0} = 1
∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0)
= P(Wt(i) < 0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0) = P(ϑi − ηt(i) < 0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0)
= 1− P(σi(√ρiη0 +
√
1− ρiξt(i)) < ϑi|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0).
By using that σi ≡ 1 and η0 is constant over a risk horizon of a year, the expression
becomes
1− P(
√
1− ρiξt(i) < ϑi −√ρiη0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) = 0)
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= Φ(
√
ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi ). (2.10)
This is thus the default probability without contagion effect.
2.3.2 Contagion default intensity
Moving on to the other case where Cij 6= 0 for all i and j, one gets
P(Zt+1(i) = 1|Zt(i) = 0,
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) 6= 0) = P(Wt(i) < 0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) 6= 0)
= P(ϑi −
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)− σi(√ρiη0 +
√
1− ρiξt(i)) < 0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) 6= 0)
Where again, by using that σi ≡ 1 and η0 is constant over a risk horizon of a year,
the expression becomes
P(−
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j)−
√
1− ρiξt(i) < −ϑi+√ρiη0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) 6= 0).
(2.11)
By linear transformation one gets, since
√
1− ρiξt(i) ∼ N (0, 1− ρi), that
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j) +
√
1− ρiξt(i)
is normally distributed with mean C0
c
∑m
j=1 E(cijZt(j)) and variance
1 − ρi + C2c
∑m
j=1 V ar(cijZt(j)). Returning to equation ( 2.11), one gets by
standardizing
P(−
m∑
j=1
cij
(C0
c
+
C√
c
xij
)
Zt(j)−
√
1− ρiξt(i) < −ϑi+√ρiη0|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j) 6= 0)
= Φ
(a+√ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi + b
)∣∣∣
a=
C0
c
∑m
j=1 E(cijZt(j)),b=
C2
c
∑m
j=1 V ar(cijZt(j))
(2.12)
which is the default probability with contagion effect of firm i.
24
2.3.3 The default number
Hatchett and Kühn introduce the fraction of defaulted firms and use the Law of
Large Numbers in their result. This means that the Zt(j) must be i.i.d. for the re-
sults hold. They present the fraction of defaulted firms and it is mt = 1m
∑m
j=1 Zt(j).
Assume that E(Zt(j)) = ξ and that V ar(Zt(j)) <∞. By the Law of Large Num-
bers, as m→∞,
mt =
1
m
m∑
j=1
Zt(j)
P−→ E(Zt(j)).
The dynamics of the fraction of defaulted firms, mt, can be found by looking at
equation ( 2.1). Then one gets that
mt+1 =
1
m
m∑
j=1
Zt+1(j) =
1
m
m∑
j=1
(
Zt(j) + (1− Zt(j))1{ Wt(j)<0}
)
= mt +
1
m
m∑
j=1
(1− Zt(j))1{ ϑj−∑mi=1 CjiZt(i)−σj(√ρjη0+√1−ρjξt(j))<0} . (2.13)
Let σj ≡ 1 and exploit that Zt(j), ξt(j) and
∑m
i=1CjiZt(i) are uncorrelated. By
applying the Law of Large Numbers, as m→∞, one gets that
1
m
m∑
j=1
(1− Zt(j))1{ ϑj−∑mi=1 CjiZt(i)−(√ρjη0+√1−ρjξt(j))<0}
P−→ E(1− Zt(j))E(1{ ϑj−∑mi=1 CjiZt(i)−(√ρjη0+√1−ρjξt(j))<0} |
m∑
i=1
CjiZt(i))
= E(1−Zt(j))P
(
ϑj−
m∑
i=1
CjiZt(i)−√ρjη0−
√
1− ρjξt(j) < 0|
m∑
i=1
CjiZt(i)
)
= E(1−Zt(j))Φ
(a+√ρjη0 − ϑj√
1− ρj + b
)∣∣∣
a=
C0
c
∑m
i=1 E(cijZt(i)),b=
C2
c
∑m
i=1 V ar(cjiZt(i))
.
If the Zt(j) are not identically distributed, but independent, one could still find out
how the expected number of defaults evolves. Generally, by using equation ( 2.8)
one gets
E(mt+1) = E(mt) +
1
m
m∑
j=1
E(1− Zt(j))Φ(y − ϑj)
∣∣
{ y=∑i CjiZt(i)}
.
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To find the distribution of mt, notice that mt is a monotone increasing function of
the macroeconomic factor η0 ∼ N (0, 1), so mt = mt(η0) and one gets that the
cumulative density function, cdf, of the fraction of defaulted firms is
P(mt(η0) < m) = Φ(m
−1
t m) (2.14)
The density function is found by differentiating the cdf, i.e. (Φ(m−1t m))′ =
φ( m
mt
)( m
mt
)′. Hatchett and Kühn found that the evolution of the fraction of de-
faulted firms when considering credit contagion hardly differed from the case when
there were only independent firms in the portfolio. However, when they looked at
the probability density function of the fraction of defaulted firms they found that
the tail of the distribution was fatter when one included credit contagion. i.e. when
(C0, C) = (1, 1) the tail was fatter then when (C0, C) = (0, 0).
2.4 Pricing
Hatchett and Kühn did not consider pricing in their paper, but they did present
the default probabilities which are to be interpreted as the default intensities. The
default intensity in the general case was found to be
P(Zt+1(i) = 1|Zt(i) = 0,
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)) = P(Wt(i) < 0
∣∣ m∑
j=1
CijZt(j))
= P(ηt(i) > ϑi −
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j))
= 1−P(ηt(i) ≤ ϑi−
m∑
j=1
CijYt(j)|
m∑
j=1
CijZt(j)) = Φ(y−ϑi)
∣∣∣
{ y=∑mj=1 CijZt(j)}
.
On the underlying stochastic basis (Ω,G,Q,F) with F = (Ft)t≥0,Ft ⊂ G, the
risk-neutral measure Q ∼ P is assumed given. The σ-algebra Ft contains the
market information up to time t. The macroeconomic factor η0 is F0-measurable
and it is not a trivial σ-algebra. One can define a random time, or the default time,
by
τi = inf{ t > 0 : Zt(i) = 1} .
For i in { 1, . . . ,m} , t = 0, 1, . . . , T one has Gt = Ft ∨ σ(τi ≤ u : u ≤ t), and
Gt ⊇ Ft ⊇ F0 ⊇ σ(η0). Recall that the information of η0 is know at t = 0, so it
is treated as a known constant that does not change during the time period of this
model. Note that τi are G-stopping times.
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Define the counting process (Poisson process) by
Nt(i) =
{
1 if τi ≤ t
0 if τi > t
which means that the event of a stopping time occurs in time as a Poisson process
with intensity λi > 0. The survival probability of the Poisson process is
P(τi > t) = P(no jumps until t) = P(Nt(i) = 0) = e−λit ∼ Exp(λi).
Thus, by substituting λi for the intensity presented by Hatchett and Kühn, one gets
that τi ∼ Exp(Φ(
∑
j CijZt(j)− ϑi)).
Assume that the stochastic interest rate rt is bounded and continuous. The time t
price of a defaultable zero coupon bond on firm i with maturity T is given by the
following formula:
Vt(i) = EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi>T} |Gt
)
. (2.15)
Equation ( 2.15) is, by the tower property of conditional expectations, equal to
EQ
(
EQ(e
− ∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi>T} |GT ) |Gt
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsdsEQ(1{ τi>T} |GT ) |Gt
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
(rs+λs(i))ds|Gt
)
.
And if rs and λs(i) are independent, then the expression becomes
Vt(i) = EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
λs(i)ds|Gt
)
.
Moving on and looking at the price of a claim when the default intensities are spec-
ified as in sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, and starting with the case in which the default
probability is without contagion effect. Recall that the default intensity of firm i
not being exposed to default contagion is Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi ) as given in equation ( 2.10).
Let rt and the default intensities be independent. By substituting λs(i) with
Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi ) one obtains that the price of a defaultable zero coupon bond at time t
in { 0, 1, . . . , T} issued by firm i, where the issuer is not in an economic relation
with other firms, would amount to calculate
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Protection seller Protection buyerReferance asset
-
pays contingent payment
ﬀ
pays spread, s
Figure 2.1: Credit Default Swap
Vt(i) = EQ
(
e
− ∫ T
t
(rs+Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
))ds|Gt
)
. (2.16)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Ft
)
EQ
(
e
− ∫ T
t
Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)ds|η0
)
.
= e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)(T−t)
EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Ft
)
where the last equality follows from the assumption that η0 is known and constant.
The default intensity Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi ) is constant for the given firm i. Since the short
rate is stochastic the price in equation ( 2.16) would be, if one uses the Vasicek
model as described in section 1.1.2 ,
Vt(i) = e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)(T−t)
P (t, T ), (2.17)
where P (t, T ) is given in equation ( 1.10).
Another element of credit risk is the recovery rate, R, which says how much of
the face value of the bond that can be recovered if the obligor defaults. If one
includes a stochastic and independent recovery rate Ri which is paid at maturity
T , then the payoff for a defaultable zero coupon bond is
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi>T} +
Rie
− ∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi≤T}
)
, and the price given in equation ( 2.15) will then be
Vt(i) = EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi>T} +Rie
− ∫ T
t
rsds1{ τi≤T} |Gt
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds(1{ τi>T} +Ri(1− 1{ τi>T} ))|Gt
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds(Ri + (1−Ri)1{ τi>T} )|Gt
)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsdsRi|Gt
)
+ EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds(1−Ri)1{ τi>T} )|Gt
)
= EQ
(
Rie
− ∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
+ EQ
(
(1−Ri)e−
∫ T
t
(rs+λs(i))ds|Gt
)
and with the default intensities inserted, the price will be
EQ
(
Rie
− ∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
+ e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)(T−t)
EQ
(
(1−Ri)e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
. (2.18)
28
A credit default swap, CDS, is a protection contract against default of a firm where
the protection buyer pays periodic payments to the protection seller who in turn
pays a one-off contingent payment if default occurs before maturity of the bond
(referance asset) issued by company i. The periodic payments to the protection
seller continues until either default or maturiy. If τi ≤ T , assume that the protection
seller has to pay the protection buyer (1 − Ri), called loss given default and is
the loss in percentage in case of default. The protection buyer has to pay a fixed
amount s, called spread, set at the time of evaluation such that the contract is fair.
The payment dates for the spread are 0 = t0 < t1 < . . . < tn = T which are
assumed to be equally spaced and no accured interest rate is paid. (If the accured
interes rate is paid then an extra term is added to the value of the claim of the
seller). Then the value at time t ≤ tj for j in { 0, 1, . . . , n} of the claim regarding
firm i of the protection buyer is
V Buyert (i) = EQ
(
s
n∑
j=0
e−
∫ tj
t rsds1{ τi>tj} |Gt
)
,
and by equation ( 2.15) the above price becomes
V Buyert (i) = EQ
(
s
n∑
j=0
e
− ∫ tjt (rs+Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
))ds|Gt
)
= s
n∑
j=0
EQ
(
e
− ∫ tjt (rs+Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
))ds|Gt
)
= s
n∑
j=0
e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)(tj−t)
EQ
(
e−
∫ tj
t rsds|Ft
)
(2.19)
where the last equality follows from the default intensity of firm i being constant. If
the Vasicek model is used, then the expression in equation ( 2.19) could be written
as
V Buyert (i) = s
n∑
j=0
e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)(tj−t)
P (t, tj). (2.20)
For the protection seller one gets that the value of the claim is, for Ri constant,
V Sellert (i) = EQ
(
e−
∫ τi
t rsds(1−Ri)1{ t<τi≤T} |Gt
)
= (1−Ri)EQ
(
e−
∫ τi
t rsds1{ t<τi≤T} |Gt
)
. (2.21)
29
Since e−
∫ τi
t rsds is bounded and continuous, and the default intensity is continuous,
corollary 5.1.3 in [6] gives that equation ( 2.21) becomes
(1−Ri)Φ(
√
ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi )1{ τi>t} e
∫ t
0 Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)ds
×EQ
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ u
t
rsdse
− ∫ u0 Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)ds
du|Ft
)
= (1−Ri)Φ(
√
ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi )1{ τi>t} e
Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)t
×
∫ T
t
e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)u
EQ
(
e−
∫ u
t
rsds|Ft
)
du. (2.22)
If one was using the Vasicek model to calculate the expectation, then equation
( 2.22) would be
V Sellert (i) = (1−Ri)Φ(
√
ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi )1{ τi>t} e
Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)t
×
∫ T
t
e
−Φ(
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi
)u
P (t, u)du. (2.23)
The contract values are set to be zero at initiation of the contract, so in order to find
the fair spread, s, one equates the two expressions, i.e. V Buyert (i) = V Sellert (i)
and solves for s.
If the issuer of the defaultable claim is in an economic relation with other firms,
then the default intensity is Φ
(at+√ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bt
)
, at =
C0
c
∑m
j=1 E(cijZt(j)) and
bt =
C2
c
∑m
j=1 V ar(cijZt(j)) as given in equation ( 2.12). The price of a default-
able zero coupon bond at time t, where firm i is in an economic relation with other
firms and the short rate is independent of the default intensity, is
Vt(i) = EQ
(
e
− ∫ T
t
(rs+Φ
(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)
)ds|Gt
)
(2.24)
= EQ
(
e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Ft
)
EQ
(
e
− ∫ T
t
Φ
(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)
ds|Gt
)
.
When the firms are in an economic relation with each other, the default intensities
are deterministic since at = C0c
∑m
j=1 E(cijZt(j)) and bt = C
2
c
∑m
j=1 V ar(cijZt(j))
are numbers that change in time. So with deterministic default intensities that in-
cludes the contagion effect, the price in equation ( 2.17) would be
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Vi(i) = e
− ∫ T
t
Φ
(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)
ds
P (t, T ).
If the stochastic recovery rate is included, one would get that equation ( 2.18) would
be
EQ
(
Rie
− ∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
+ e
− ∫ T
t
Φ(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)ds
EQ
(
(1−Ri)e−
∫ T
t
rsds|Gt
)
.
When the default intensities include the contagion term, the price of a CDS would
be, for equation ( 2.20)
V Buyert (i) = s
n∑
j=0
e
− ∫ tjt Φ(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)ds
P (t, tj).
And for the protection seller equation ( 2.23) would be
V Sellert (i) = (1−Ri)1{ τi>t} e
∫ t
0 Φ(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)ds
×
∫ T
t
e
− ∫ u0 Φ(
as+
√
ρiη0−ϑi√
1−ρi+bs
)ds
Φ(
au +
√
ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi + bu
)P (t, u)du.
2.5 Remarks
The portfolio default process is a binary indicator variable taking the values 0 and
1, so it can be understood as Bernoulli random variables
Zt(i) =
{
1 with probability pi
0 with probability 1− pi,
The self default probability pi = Φ(−ϑi), is as found in equation ( 2.9). This
means that the Zt(i) are not identically distributed. They might be independent
by the argument given by Hatchett and Kühn in section 2.2. Since the Zt(i) are
not i.i.d., the Law of Large Numbers and the Central Limit Theorem can not be
applied to find the asymptotic distribution of the sum in expression ( 2.6), and the
dynamics of the fraction of defaulted firms can not converge in probability.
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In general, there is no clear description of default caused by bad performance of
firm i itself and default caused by contagion from firm j in this model. In the model
presented by Hatchett and Kühn, a firm defaults if its wealth falls below zero, and
the wealth is the difference of the assets and liabilities of firm i. This means that
firm i defaults if it has more liabilities than it has assets. If one wants to introduce
a model that distinguishes between self default and default by contagion one could
proceed as follows:
Let the wealth of firm i be denoted Vt(i) and let{
Vt(i) = ϑi − ηt(i) t = 1, . . . , T
V0(i) = ϑi > 0
where ϑi and ηt(i) are given as in [3]. Then introduce a self default process Yt(i)
given by
Yt(i) = 1{ Vt(i)<ℓi} =
{
1 self default of firm i
0 firm i solvent
where ℓi < 0 is the admissible level of liabilities. Let the portfolio default process
be, for t = 0, . . . , T
{
Zt+1(i) = Zt(i) + (1− Zt(i))
(
Yt+1(i)− (1 + Yt+1(i))1{ Wt+1(i)<0}
)
Z0(i) = 0.
The wealth process is depending on t+1 now, which means that the model captures
default immediately. The portfolio default process is still 1 if firm i has defaulted,
and 0 otherwise. The Yt(i) are independent, but not identically distributed, but they
are driven by some Gaussian noice. The probability of default in the portfolio for
firms that are not in an economic relation with other firms is
P(Zt+1(i) = 1
∣∣Zt(i) = 0)
= P
(
Yt+1(i) + (1− Yt+1)1{ Wt+1(i)<0} = 1
∣∣Yt(i) = 0,1{ Wt+1(i)<0} = 0)
= Φ(
ℓi − ϑi +√ρiη0√
1− ρi ).
The default probability for firm i being in an economic relation with other firms is
the same as in the model suggested by Hatchett and Kühn, i.e.
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P(Zt+1(i) = 1
∣∣Zt(i) = 0)
= P
(
Yt+1(i) + (1− Yt+1)1{ Wt+1(i)<0} = 1
∣∣Yt(i) = 0,1{ Wt+1(i)<0} = 1)
= Φ
(a+√ρiη0 − ϑi√
1− ρi + b
)∣∣∣
a=
C0
c
∑m
j=1 E(cijYt+1(j)),b=
C2
c
∑m
j=1 V ar(cijYt+1(j))
.
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Chapter 3
Contagion model in continuous
time
Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg, [2], present a contagion model in continuous
time which is based on [4]. They chose to let the default intensities depend
on a long range dependent process describing the macroeconomic factor because
macroeconomic factors tend show a long range dependence effect. As in the dis-
crete time model, a default in the portfolio can be caused by either self default or
default by contagion. Opposite to [3], their paper is considering the pricing of
defaultable derivatives, where the derivatives depend on the macroeconomic pro-
cess and are exposed to default contagion. Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg are
able to give explicit pricing formulas for derivatives. It is assumed that the primary
assets on the market (a primary asset in banking might be the bank’s reserves or
loans) are not driven by a long range dependent process. Both self default and de-
fault by contagion happen instantaneously and the defaulting state is absorbing.
3.1 The default model
There are only two states for the firms in the portfolio: defaulted or solvent. Let
a portfolio consist of m firms, where each firm is indexed by i in { 1, 2, . . . ,m} .
The portfolio default process is taking the values { 0, 1} m and is described by
Zt = (Zt(1), . . . , Zt(m)), t ≥ 0,
where each random component Zt(i) describes if firm i has defaulted or not by
time t, meaning that
Zt(i) =
{
0 firm i is solvent at time t,
1 firm i has defaulted at time t .
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Since one is interested in credit contagion, one has to distinguish between default
in the portfolio which is caused by the firm itself or by contagion from the default
of other firms. The self default indicator process, which is a random vector taking
the values { 0, 1} m, is described by
Yt = (Yt(1), . . . , Yt(m)), t ≥ 0,
where each Yt(j) is given by
Yt(j) =
{
0 firm j is solvent at time t,
1 firm j has defaulted at time t by itself.
Denote by τj = τj(ω) the default time of firm j for j in { 1, 2, . . . ,m} . Then
Yt(j) = 1{ τj≤t} , t ≥ 0. The random variable Yt(j) generates the natural filtra-
tion denoted FY (j)t := σ(Yu(j) : u ≤ t). The self default processes are assumed
to be independent.
In [2], the suggested modeling of credit contagion in continuous time is through a
contagion matrix indicator process. The matrix Ct is in Rm×m and its coefficients
indicate if there is contagion between the firms or not. This means that if firm i
defaults, then Ct(i, j) will determine if there was any infection from firm i to firm
j at time t. For any time t ≥ 0, the coefficients in the matrix are described by
Ct(i, j) =
{
0 no infection of default,
1 if default of firm i causes firm j to default at time t.
This way of describing contagion differs from the one in the discrete time model.
In the discrete time model, the entries in the contagion matrix can be both positive
and negative, but in the continuous time model the entries are either 0 or 1. In the
discrete time model the contagion is more of an average contagion between the
firms that may be in a competitive or cooperative economic relationship, whereas
in the continuous time model the default contagion is not divided into ’good’ and
’bad’ contagion. The contagion is a pure default contagion from firm i to firm j, and
no other firms can get firm j back in business. In the discrete time model there is
no clear description of the self default process as it is in the continuous time model.
The contagion matrix process generates the filtration FCijt = σ(Cu(i, j) : u ≤ t)
for every i, j in { 1, . . . ,m} , i 6= j. One can express the portfolio default indicator
process of firm j as
Zt(j) = Yt(j) + (1− Yt(j))
(
1−
∏
i 6=j
(1−Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i))
)
, t ≥ 0. (3.1)
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Since firm j obviously is influencing itself, Ct(j, j) ≡ 1, the portfolio default pro-
cess can be written in a shorter form;
Zt(j) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i)), t ≥ 0. (3.2)
Defaults in the portfolio are caused by fluctuations in the macroeconomic factor,
and defaults happen at τi, and the stopping time τi has an intensity λi which is
driven by an underlying stochastic process Ψ = (Ψt)t≥0 with values in Rd rep-
resenting the evolution of the macroeconomy. Ψ generates the filtration FΨt =
σ(Ψu : u ≤ t). Ψ will be described in details later in section 3.4.
3.2 The probability space and assumptions
The system is described by the process (Ψt, Yt, Ct)t≥0 on the complete probability
space (Ω,F ,P), where Ft := FΨt ∨ FYt ∨ FCt . The larger filtration Gt := FΨ∞ ∨
FYt ∨ FCt contains information about the whole path of (Ψt)t≥0. All filtrations
are assumed to be right-continuous and P-augmented. It is aslo assumed that the
investors have knowledge about (Ft)t≥0, that the investors know the contagion
structure and if a firm has defaulted or not. Further assumptions are
1. Ψ is not affected by Y and Z, meaning that for every boundedFΨ∞-measurable
random variable η, E(η|Ft) = E(η|FΨt ), t ≥ 0.
2. The processes (Yt(i))t≥0 and (Ct(i, j))t≥0 are conditionally orthogonal of
the filtration (Gt)t≥0, meaning that for every { i1, . . . , ik} ⊆ { 1, . . . ,m}
and for every choice of (α1, β1), . . . , (αl, βl) in
{ (i, j) ∈ { 1, . . . ,m} 2|i 6= j} one gets that for all tj ≥ t, j = 1, . . . , k and
sn ≥ t, n = 1, . . . , l
E
( k∏
j=1
l∏
n=1
f(Ytj (ij))g(Csn(αn, βn))|Gt
)
=
k∏
j=1
E
(
f(Ytj (ij))|FΨ∞∨FY (ij)t
) l∏
n=1
E
(
g(Csn(αn, βn))|FΨ∞∨FC(αn,βn)
)
for f, g : {0, 1} → R and i, j in { 1, . . . ,m} , i 6= j .
3. The self default process (Yt(i))t≥0 is a doubly stochastic process with re-
spect to the filtration (FΨ∞ ∨ FYt )t≥0. The stochastic intensity of (Yt(i))t≥0
is denoted λi(t,Ψt) for λi : R2 → R+. This means that
E(1− Ys(i)|Gt) = (1− Yt(i))e−
∫ s
t
λi(u,Ψu)du, s ≥ t.
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4. The contagion processes (Ct(i, j))t≥0 for i 6= j are FΨ∞-conditionally time-
inhomogeneous Markov chains, i.e. for every function f : { 0, 1} → R,
E
(
f(Cs(i, j))|FΨ∞ ∨ FC(i,j)t
)
= E
(
f(Cs(i, j))|FΨ∞ ∨ σ(Ct(i, j))
)
, s ≥ t.
5. For all i,j in { 1, . . . ,m} , i 6= j, and states h,k in { 0, 1} , the conditional
transition probabilities are denoted by
pijts(k, h) = P
(
Cs(i, j) = h|FΨ∞ ∨ σ(Ct(i, j) = k)
)
and the process (pijts(k, h))s∈R+ is assumed to be continuous for everty t in
R+, i,j in { 1, . . . ,m} and k,h in { 0, 1} .
3.3 Contagion classes
By assuming that the matrix C is time-independent and deterministic one can divide
the m firms in the portfolio into fixed contagion classes. Firms belonging to the
same contagion class need to satisfy the following:
1. Reflexivity: C(i, i) = 1 for all i in { 1, . . . ,m} .
2. Symmetry: C(i, j) = C(j, i) for all i,j in { 1, . . . ,m} .
3. Transitivity: C(i, h)C(h, j) ≤ C(i, j) for all i,j,h in { 1, . . . ,m} .
The contagion classes are disjoint and denoted by
[i] := { j ∈ { 1, . . . ,m} |C(i, j) = 1}
where it is assumed that the portfolio consists of k ≤ m contagion classes [i1], . . . , [ik].
The contagion classes might represent local markets. There can not be two differ-
ent contagion classes defaulting at the same time, otherwise the two classes would
actually be the same. Since the matrix C now is assumed to be time-independent
and deterministic the portfolio default process in equation ( 3.1) becomes
Zt(j) = Yt(j) + (1− Yt(j))
(
1−
∏
i 6=j
(1− C(i, j)Yt(i))
)
.
One sees that Zt(j) = 1 if Yt(j) = 1 and Zt(j) = 1 −
∏
i 6=j(1 − C(i, j)Yt(i)) if
Yt(j) = 0. The contagion part
(
1−∏i 6=j(1−C(i, j)Yt(i))) = 1 and gives default
in the portfolio in position j if there exists some i such that C(i, j)Yt(i) = 1. This
means that there must be at least one i in [j] in order to have a default in the
portfolio in position j. On the other hand, if
(
1 −∏i 6=j(1 − C(i, j)Yt(i))) = 0
then C(i, j)Yt(i) = 0 for all i. In order for C(i, j)Yt(i) = 0, either Yt(i) = 0 or
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Yt(i) = 1 and C(i, j) = C(j, i) = 0, by the symmetry assumption. This means
that Yt(i) = 0 for all j in [i], and one gets that
Zt(i) = 0 ⇐⇒ Zt(j) = 0 for all j in [i],
which means that either all firms in the same contagion class have defaulted or that
all firms are solvent. According to Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg this form
of classification of the firms makes their modeling different from usual credit risk
contagion modeling since usual modeling would increase the default hazard of all
the other firms in the same class when a default in that class occured. All firms
belonging to the same contagion class [i] have a default intensity given by
λ
[i]
t =
∑
j∈[i]
λj(t,Ψt).
Since the contagion matrix is assumed to be time-independent and deterministic,
the default intensities of the portfolio default process, (Zt)t≥0, are as the default
intensities of the self default indicator process (Yt(j))t≥0. The different contagion
classes are independent.
In the discrete time model all the firms and their enviroments were assumed to
be fairly homogeneous, but they could not be put in the type of contagion classes
described above since the contagion matrix is not symmetric. In the discrete time
model the contagion matrix is deterministic and the cij which describes if there
exists a connection between the firms i and j is symmetric and transient.
3.3.1 The default number
Like in the discrete time model, one can find the average number of defaulted firms
within the portfolio. In the continuous time model, the default number process is
linked to the contagion classes. All the firms in the portfolio are split into l ≤ m
homogeneous groups, denoted by G1, . . . , Gl, where each group contains all the
firms that have the same default intensity. The groups might represent firms with
identical credit rating (the probability of the issuer being able to pay its debt) or
firms belonging to the same industry. For h in { 1, . . . , l} , Gh can be written as
the disjoint union of contagion classes, i.e.
Gh =
sh⋃
k=1
[jhk ]
where sh is the number of contagion classes that group Gh consists of. Then the
weighted average number of defaults within group Gh is given by
mt(h) :=
1
sh
( ∑
i∈[jh1 ]
Zt(i)
nh1
+ . . .+
∑
i∈[jhsh ]
Zt(i)
nhsh
)
(3.3)
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where nhi is the cardinality of the contagion class [jhi ] for i in { 1, . . . , sh} and
mt := (mt(1), . . . ,mt(l)). Since the contagion classes are conditionally indepen-
dent of the filtration Gt, by assumption in section 3.2, the summands of the process
mt are conditionally independent as well.
Recall that there can not be simultaneous defaults of contagion classes and all firms
within a contagion class default at the same time. By following the reasoning of the
proof of Lemma 3.4 in [11] one gets that, for h in { 1, . . . , l} , the counting process
(mt)t≥0 will jump from a state u in Rl with u = (u1, . . . , ul) =
(
(v1
s1
, . . . , vl
sl
) :
vh ∈ { 0, . . . , sh}
)
to a state of the form u+ eh
sh
if and only if the next defaulting
firm belongs to group Gh. The eh is the h-th element in the standard basis of Rl.
The uh increases only in steps of 1sh . The transition intensity of mt(h) from the
state u into the state u+ eh
sh
is given by
λ
mt(h)
t (u, u+
eh
sh
) = sh(1− uh)λGh(t,Ψt)
where λGh(t,Ψt) is the default intensity of every firm belonging to group Gh, i.e.
the default intensiyt of Gh, and uh is the proportion of firms that have defaulted in
group Gh at time t.
The following example is ment to illustrate the contagion matrix and group struc-
ture.
Example: Let there be two groups, Gi, i = 1, 2, with 3 firms in one group and
4 firms in the other group. Let the contagion matrix be deterministic. Then the
contagion matrix is as follows:
C =
(
C3×3 C3×4
C4×3 C4×4
)
Let Id be the identity matrix in Rd, 0d×k be the zero matrix and let 1d×k be the
matrix with only entries 1. Then one can consider the two following contagion
cases:
C1 =
(
13×3 03×4
04×3 14×4
)
C2 =
(
13×3 03×4
14×3 I4×4
)
The interpretation of the case in C1 is that there is default contagion between the
3 firms in group 1, as well as it is contagion between the 4 firms in group 2. The
zero matrices tells that there is no default contagin from G1 and over to G2 and
no contagion the other way around either. The matrix C2 models contagion within
G1, no default contagion from G1 to G2, default contagin from group 2 over to
group 1 and no contagion within group 2. If the matrix C = 112×12 there is
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default contagion between all the 12 firms, and the case C = I12 means that there
is no default contagion between the firms. To explain the contagion effect in the
case of C2 a little bit more in detail, assume that the firms in group G1 are called
a1, a2 and a3, and the firms in G2 are called b1, b2, b3 and b4. Then 13×3 means
that Ct(ai, aj) = 1 for all i, j = 1, 2, 3. I4×4 means that Ct(bi, bi) = 1 for
all i = 1, 2, 3, 4. The case where 03×4 tells that Ct(ai, bj) = 0 for all i, j, and
14×3 means that Ct(bi, aj) = 1 for all i, j as well as it has to include self default,
Ct(bi, bi) = 1.
3.4 The macroeconomic process
The macroeconomic process Ψ is chosen to be modeled as a one dimensional frac-
tional Brownian motion, fBm, with Hurst index H > 12 , (See appendix B). Since
the process is one dimensional it might be seen to represent a weighted mean of a
vector of macroeconomic variables. The fBm was chosen to represent the macroe-
conomic factors (such as supply and demand, unemploymentrate and inflation)
since these factors often show a long range dependence. Since fBm is a long range
time dependent process, it is not Markovian. The macroeconomic variable is given
by
ΨHt := ψ(
∫ t
0
g(s)dBHs ), t ∈ [0, T ], (3.4)
where ψ is an invertible continuous function, and g is a deterministic function in
Hµ([0, T ]) (see appendix B for more) such that 1
g(s) is defined for all s in [0,T].
Since g is a deterministic function the integral in equation ( 3.4) can be understood
in a pathwise Riemann-Stieltjes sense by using the formula for integration by parts.
(See page 124 in [1].)
Biagini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg restricted themself to the case where, for all i
in { 1, . . . ,m} the default intensities of the self default processes (Yt(i))t≥0 are
stochastic and of the form
λi(t,ΨHt ) = β
i(t)
∫ t
0
g(s)dBHs + γ
i(t), t ∈ [0, T ] (3.5)
where βi and γi are continuous functions.
The modeling choice of both [2] and [3] when it comes to the macroeconomic pro-
cess is thus a zero mean Gaussian process. The disturbing element to the wealth
process in equation ( 2.3) is decomposed into one term handling the macroeco-
nomic factor and another term describing the individual fluctuations disturbing the
wealth of a firm, whereas in the continuous time model only the macroeconomic
factor is described explicitly. One big difference in the two models studied is re-
garding the macroeconomic factor. In the discrete case, the macroeconomic factor
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is constant over the time horizon of one year, but in the continuous model it is a
stochastic process representing a mean of macroeconomic variables. The macroe-
conomic process in the continuous time model is a fractional Brownina motion,
so it is not a Markovian process. If the macroeconomic variable in the discrete
time model was not constant, it would be Gaussian and thus a (standard) Brownian
motion as well as it would be Markovian.
3.5 The price of credit derivatives
The prices of derivatives are influenced by the contagion matrix C and by the
macroeconomic factor Ψ. Before presenting the pricing formulas, there are some
assumptions that need to be stated:
1. The information that the investor has at time t is given by Ft, i.e. the investor
knows the processes Ψ, the self default process Y and the contagion matrix
C up to time t.
2. The default free interest rate is deterministic, and it is set equal to 0.
3. The risk neutral pricing measure Q exists and is known such that the price at
time t of anyFT -measurable claimLT inL1(Ω,Q) is given by EQ(LT |Ft) =
Lt for 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
It is not assumed that the pricing measure necessarily is unique. Without the spe-
cific expression of the macroeconomic process Ψ as given in equation ( 3.4), Bi-
agini, Fuschini and Klüppelberg formulated the following pricing formula which
is given without any restrictions on the matrix C, i.e. the matrix is stochastic and
depends on time:
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Theorem 1. Let f : R × Rm −→ R be a bounded measurable function. Let
α = (α1, . . . , αm), β = (β1 . . . , βm) and z = (z1, . . . , zm) be in { 0, 1} m and
h(i), k(i) be in { 0, 1} m−1 for i = 1, . . . ,m. Set hii = kii := 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m,
hij := [h
(i)]j and kij := [k(i)]j for i 6= j. Then for t in [0,T]
EQ(f(ΨT , ZT )|Ft) =
∑
α,β,z∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αjzj
m∏
j=1
z
1−αj
j
×
m∏
i=1
(
(Yt(i)at(i))
1−βi(1− Yt(i))βi
)
EQ
(
f(ΨT , z)
m∏
i=1
bt,T (i)
βi |FΨt
)
, (3.6)
with
at(i) =
∑
h(i)∈{ 0,1} m−1
1{ h˜i(α,h)=0} 1{ C(i)τi =h(i)}
bt,T (i) =
∑
h(i),k(i)∈{ 0,1} m−1
1{ C(i)t =k(i)}
×
(∫ ∞
T
λi(u,Ψu)e
− ∫ u
t
λi(s,Ψs)dspt,u(k
(i), h(i))du
+1{ h˜i(α,h)=0}
∫ T
t
λi(u,Ψu)e
− ∫ u
t
λi(s,Ψs)dspt,u(k
(i), h(i))du
)
where
h˜i(α, h) :=
{
0 if ∑mj=1 αjhij = 0,
1 otherwise . (3.7)
and pt,τi(k(i), h(i)) :=
∏m
j=1 p
ij
tτi
([k(i)]j , [h
(i)]j) denotes the joint transition prob-
abilities of the random vector C(i)τi from time t to time τi.
For proof, see [2].
If one assumes a time-independent contagion matrix which might be random, mean-
ing that
Ct(i, j) = Cω(i, j), t ≥ 0, (3.8)
where the Cω(i, j) are given by i.i.d. random variables which are independent of
the processes Y and Ψ. Then the filtration
Ft = FΨt ∨ FYt ∨ σ(C) for t > 0. Again, without specifying the macroeconomic
process the general pricing formula becomes as in the following theorem:
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Theorem 2. If the contagion matrix is of the form ( 3.8), the pricing formula ( 3.6)
for 0 < t ≤ T is given by
EQ(f(ΨT , ZT )|Ft) =
∑
α,z∈{ 0,1} m
∑
h∈{ 0,1} m(m−1)
(−1)
∑m
i=1 αizi
×
m∏
i=1
z1−αii (1− Yt(i))h˜i(α,h)
× 1{ C=h} EQ
(
f(ΨT , z)e
− ∫ T
t
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α,h)λ
i(u,Ψu)du
∣∣∣FΨt ) (3.9)
and for t = 0 the pricing formula becomes
EQ(f(ΨT , ZT )) =
∑
α,z∈{ 0,1} m
∑
h∈{ 0,1} m(m−1)
(−1)
∑m
i=1 αizi
×
m∏
i=1
z1−αii Q(C = h) EQ
(
f(ΨT , z)e
− ∫ T0
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α,h)λ
i(u,Ψu)du
)
(3.10)
where h˜i(α, h) is as in ( 3.7) with hii := 1 for i = 1, . . . ,m and hij := [h]ij
for i 6= j.
For proof, see [2].
If the contagion matrix is deterministic, i.e. for every i,j in { 1, . . . ,m} and all
t ≥ 0,
Ct(i, j)(ω) = Ct(i, j) for all ω ∈ Ω,
one has that the filtration FCt = { ∅,Ω} for every t in [0,T]. In this situation, the
pricing formula ( 3.6) becomes:
Corollary 1. Assuming that the contagion matrix is deterministic, the pricing for-
mula ( 3.6) simplifies to
EQ(f(ΨT , ZT )|Ft) =
∑
α,z∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
i=1 αizi
m∏
i=1
z1−αii (1− Yt(i))h˜i(α)
× EQ
(
f(ΨT , z)e
− ∫ T
t
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)λ
i(u,Ψu)du|FΨt
)
(3.11)
where
h˜i(α) :=
{
0 if ∑mj=1 αjCT (i, j) = 0,
1 otherwise .
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The following is an example of the use of formula ( 3.11).
Example: To find the price of a defaultable bond of a firm in group Gi for i = 1, 2,
let there be one bond of one firm in Gi at one time. Recall that firms in the same
group have the same default intensity. The short rate was assumed deterministic
and it was set to be 0. The bond has payoff f(ΨT , z) = (1− Z [i]T ), and one has to
calculate
V
[i]
0 = EQ
(
(1− Z [i]T )e−
∫ T
0
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)λ
i(u,Ψu)du
)
.
Since the macroeconomic process has not been specified yet, one can specify the
default intensity λi(u,Ψu) = λi(u,Bu) = λiu by, for instance the Vasicek model
as was done in section 1.1.2. The number of firms, m, is equal to the total number
of firms in the two groups.
If one is to consider the pricing of a CDS in this setting, one would get that the value
of the pricing formula at time t = 0 for the protection buyer of a defaultable bond
with payoff (1− Z [i]T ) would be, if the spread is paid continuously until default,
Buyer V [i]0 = s
∫ T
0
EQ
(
(1− Z [i]T )e−
∫ u
0
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)λ
i(s,Ψs)ds
)
du,
and for the protection seller one gets
Seller V [i]0 =
∫ T
0
EQ
(
(1− Z [i]T −R[i])e−
∫ u
0
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)λ
i(s,Ψs)ds
×
m∑
i=1
h˜i(α)λ
i(u,Ψu)
)
du.
And to find the fair spread, one equates the expression for the buyer and seller and
solves for the spread s.
By specifying the macroeconomic process as done in section 3.4, the pricing for-
mula for a long range dependent macroeconomic state variable process is given in
the following theorem.
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Theorem 3. Assume that the contagion matrix C is deterministic and that for all i
in { 1, . . . ,m} the intensities of the self default processes Yi = (Yt(i))t≥0 are of
the form
λi(t,ΨHt ) := β
i(t)
∫ t
0
g(s)dBHs + γ
i(t) t ≥ 0,
where βi and γi are continuous functions. g is in Hµ([0, T ]) ⊂ LH2 ([0, T ]) with
µ > 1-H and such that 1
g(s) is well defined for all s in [0,T]. Let f(·, z) and ψ(·) be
deterministic continuous functions and denote for all z in { 0, 1} m
fψ(x, z) := f(ψ(x), z), x ∈ R
and
fψα (x, z) := e
−αxfψ(x, z), α, x ∈ R,
where fψ = f ◦ ψ. Assume that there exists some a in R such that fψa (·, z) and its
Fourier transform fˆψa (·, z) belong to L1(R) for all z in { 0, 1} m. Finally, let ψ be
invertible and set
ΨHt := ψ(
∫ t
0
g(s)dBHs ).
Then the price ( 3.11) at time t in [0,T] is given by the following formula
EQ(f(ΨT , ZT )|Ft) =∑
α,z∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
i=1 αizi
m∏
i=1
(
z1−αii (1− Yt(i))h˜i(α)
)
e−
∫ T
t
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)γ
i(u)du
× e
∫ t
0
∑m
i=1 h˜i(α)β
i(u)
∫ u
0 g(s)dB
H
s du
1
2π
∫
R
e
1
2
∫ T
t
∫ t
0 η(s,ξ)η(u,ξ)|u−s|2H−2dsdu
× e
∫ t
0 η(s,ξ)dB
H
s (3.12)
× e
∫ t
0
(
I
−(H− 12 )
t−
(
I
−(H− 12 )
T−
(
(η(s,ξ)1[t,T ](s))
H− 12
)))H− 12
dBHs ˆ
fψα (ξ, z)dξ
where
h˜i(α) :=
{
0 if ∑mj=1 αjCT (i, j) = 0,
1 otherwise ,
and
η(s, ξ) := g(s)
(
a+ iξ −
∫ T
s
m∑
i=1
h˜i(α)β
i(u)du
)
, s ∈ [0, T ]
and for α = H − 12 in (0,12 )
(I−α
t−
η)(s) :=
1
Γ(1− α)
d
ds
(∫ t
s
η(r)(r − s)α−1dr
)
For a proof, see [2], and for more on the Fourier transform in this case, see ap-
pendix A.
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Chapter 4
An extension of the contagion
model in continuous time
This chapter is aiming at an extension of the description of the contagion matrix
introduced in [2]. Instead of having a zero-one model indicating whether there is
default contagion or not, one could try to describe the possible default contagion
of firm i as a positive or negative contagion relative to firm j as was done in [3].
The self default of firm j is the indicator variable Yt(j) = 1{ τj≤t} , t ≥ 0. The
Yt(j) are assumed to be independent of each other.
The probability space and assumptions are the same as in the continuous time
model which are stated in sections 3.2 and 3.5.
4.1 The contagion model
The default model of firm j in { 1, . . . ,m} is the same used by [2] and is given
by
Dj(t) = Yt(j) + (1− Yt(j))
(
1−
∏
i 6=j
(1−Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i))
)
, t ≥ 0, (4.1)
and since Ct(i, i) ≡ 1 the process Dt(j) can be written in a shorter form:
Dt(j) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i)), t ≥ 0. (4.2)
Let x ≥ 1 be in N. The contagion matrix is now of the form
Ct(i, j) =

1− 1
x
firm i has a negative contagion effect on firm j,
0 firm i has no contagion effect on firm j,
1− x firm i has a positive contagion effect on firm j .
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Figure 4.1: Possible values of Dt(j).
which means that if x = 1 then Ct(i, j) = 0 for all i 6= j in { 1, . . . ,m} so there
does not exist any economic relations between the different firms in the portfolio
and they are thus all independent of each other. The expression ’negative contagion
effect’ is to be understood as firm i and j were in a cooperative economic relation
and the default of firm i was not good for firm j, whereas ’positive contagion ef-
fect’ means that firm i and j were in a competitive business relation and the default
of firm j was good for firm i.
By looking at the contagion term
∏m
i=1(1 − Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i)) when Yt(i) = 1 one
gets that, for i 6= j,
m∏
i=1
(1− Ct(i, j)) =

∏m
i=1
1
xij
= y ∈ (0, 1]
1∏m
i=1 xij = z ∈ [1,∞].
Then the default model expressed in equation ( 4.2 ) gives the following interpre-
tation for all i, j in { 1, . . . ,m} , including the case when i = j:
Dt(j) = 1−
m∏
i=1
(1− Ct∧τi(i, j)Yt(i))
=

1 self-default of firm j
1− y > 0 ∈ [0, 1) default by contagion for firm j
0 firm j is solvent
1− z < 0 ∈ [−∞, 0] firm j is solvent after contagion
where the last equality follows from firm i having defaulted. So this means that
Dt(j) is taking values in [−∞, 1]. If Dt(j) = (1 − y) > 0 it means that firm
j has defaulted by contagion from the default of firm i, i.e. there has been a
negative contagion which was bad for firm j. If Dt(j) = 1 firm j has defaulted
by itself. If Dt(j) = 0 there was no default effect in the portfolio and firm j is
solvent, and if Dt(j) = 1 − z < 0 then the firms were in a competitive eco-
nomic relation and firm j is better off than it was previously, i.e. there has been a
positive contagion. Thus, the closer Dt(j) is to −∞, the better it is for firm j as
illustrated in figure 4.1. All in all, if Dt(j) > 0 there is a default in the portfolio
at postition j and if Dt(j) ≤ 0 firm j in the portfolio is solvent. One could then
describe the process Zt(j) given in the continuous time model in chapter 3 by the
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indicator function Zt(j) = 1{ Dt(j)>0} .
4.2 Pricing formula
By considering the case where the contagion matrix C is deterministic, one gets
the following pricing formula:
Theorem 1. Let f : R × Rm −→ R be a bounded measurable function. Let
α = (α1, . . . , αm) be in { 0, 1} m, dj in [−∞, 1] for each j in { 1, . . . ,m} . For t
in [0,T]
EQ(f(ΨT , DT )|Ft) =
∑
d∈[−∞,1]m
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑
j αj
×
m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
(
1− CT (i, j) + CT (i, j)(1− Yt(i))
)αj
× EQ
(
f(ΨT , d)(e
− ∫ T
t
λi(u,Ψu)du)αj |FΨt
)
.
Proof. By the law of total probability (see appendix A) it follows that
EQ
(
f(ΨT , DT )|Ft
)
= EQ
(
EQ(f(ΨT , DT )|Gt)|Ft
)
= EQ
( ∑
d∈[−∞,1]m
f(ΨT , d) EQ(1{ ~DT=~d} |Gt) |Ft
)
. (4.3)
Equation ( 4.2) becomes DT (j) = 1 −
∏m
i=1(1 − CT (i, j)YT (i)). Starting by
focusing on the inner expectation E(1{ ~DT=~d} |Gt) and looking at
1{ DT (j)=dj} =
{
1 Dj = dj ,
0 otherwise,
for dj in [−∞, 1] for each j in { 1, . . . ,m} , and putting
1{ DT (j)=dj} = 1− aT (j).
Then
1{ ~DT=~d} =
m∏
j=1
(1− aT (j)) (4.4)
where aT (j) =
∏m
i=1(1− CT (i, j)YT (i)).
By applying the following identity:
m∏
j=1
(Aj +Bj) =
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
m∏
j=1
(A
1−αj
j B
αj
j ),
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where αj ∈ { 0, 1} for j = 1, . . . ,m. Setting 00 := 1 the formula also holds if
there exists some j in { 1, . . . ,m} such that Aj = 0 or Bj = 0. Applying this
formula to equation ( 4.4) with
Aj = 1 and Bj = (−aT (j))
one gets that
m∏
j=1
(1− aT (j)) =
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
m∏
j=1
(−aT (j))αj ,
and the inner conditional expectation in equation ( 4.3) becomes
EQ(1{ ~DT=~d} |Gt) = EQ(
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αj
m∏
j=1
(aT (j))
αj |Gt)
=
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αjEQ
( m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
(
(1− CT (i, j)YT (i))
)αj |Gt).
Since T ≥ t, assumption 2 in section 3.2 holds and
=
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αj
m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
EQ(
(
(1− CT (i, j)YT (i))
)αj |Gt). (4.5)
Since
EQ(
(
(1− CT (i, j)YT (i))
)αj |Gt)
= EQ(
(
(1− CT (i, j) + CT (i, j)− CT (i, j)YT (i))
)αj |Gt)
=
(
1αj − CT (i, j)αj + CT (i, j)αjEQ((1− YT (i))αj |Gt)
)
is the same as EQ(
(
(1 − CT (i, j)YT (i))
)αj |Gt) for αj = 0, 1, and since the ex-
pression is either 1 for αj = 0 or
(
1 − CT (i, j) + CT (i, j)EQ((1 − YT (i))|Gt)
)
for αj = 1, then the αj can come out. The product of a measurable fuction is still
measurable, so by assumption 3 in section 3.2 one gets that equation ( 4.5) is equal
to the following:
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αj
m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
(
1−CT (i, j)+CT (i, j)(1−Yt(i))e−
∫ T
t
λi(u,Ψu)du
)αj
.
Returning to the aim, which is equation ( 4.3), one gets that
EQ(f(ΨT , DT )|Ft) = EQ
( ∑
d∈[−∞,1]m
f(ΨT , d) EQ(1{ ~DT=~d} |Gt) |Ft
)
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= EQ
( ∑
d∈[−∞,1]m
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αj
m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
f(ΨT , d)
×
[
1− CT (i, j) + CT (i, j)(1− Yt(i))e−
∫ T
t
λi(u,Ψu)du
]αj |Ft)
=
∑
d∈[−∞,1]m
∑
α∈{ 0,1} m
(−1)
∑m
j=1 αj
m∏
j=1
m∏
i=1
(
1−CT (i, j)+CT (i, j)(1−Yt(i))
)αj
× EQ
(
f(ΨT , d)(e
− ∫ T
t
λi(u,Ψu)du)αj |FΨt
)
,
where the last equatlity follows from assumption 1 in section 3.2.

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Appendix A
Elements on analysis and
probability theory
Most of the contents in this section is from [9].
Weak Law of Large Numbers
LetX1, . . . , Xn be independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with meanE(Xi) =
ξ and variance σi <∞. Then the average X = (X1+...+Xn)n satisfies
X
P−→ ξ as n→∞.
The meaning of ’weak’ is that the convergence is only for the n’th element in the
sequence, versus the strong Law of Large Numberes where the convergance is for
the whole sequence.
Linear transformation I
If X ∼ N (µ, σ2), then Y = aX + b ∼ N (aµ+ b, a2σ2) for a and b constants.
Linear transformation II
If X and Y are independent random variables with distributions X ∼ N (µX , σ2X)
and Y ∼ N (µY , σ2Y ), then the sum X + Y ∼ N (µX + µY, σ2X + σ2Y ).
The Continuity Theorem
If Xn is a sequence of random variables such that Xn
P−→ X and if the function f
is continuous at X, then
f(Xn)
P−→ f(X) as n→∞.
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Central Limit Theorem
Let X1, . . . , Xn be i.i.d. with mean E(Xi) = ξ and variance σi <∞. Then
√
n(X − ξ)
σ
L−→ N (0, 1) as n→∞.
The next definition is the definition of expectation of a random variable.
Expectation
A random variable X : Ω → Rn on the probability space (Ω,F ,P) such that X is
F-measurable has expectation E(X) = ∫ΩX(ω)dP(ω) if ∫Ω |X(ω)|dP(ω) < ∞.
And for some A in F ,
E(1A) =
∫
Ω
1AdP(ω) =
∫
A
dP(ω) = P(A).
The law of total probability is as follows:
The Law of Total Probability
LetB1, . . . Bm be such that∪mi=1Bi = Ω andBi∩Bj = ∅ for i 6= j with P(Bi) > 0
for all i. Then, for any event A in Ω,
P(A) = P(A ∩ Ω) =
m∑
i=1
P(A ∩Bi) =
m∑
i=1
E(1A∩Bi) =
m∑
i=1
E(1A1Bi).
Some more on the Fourier transform which occurs in equation ( 3.12).
Recall that the Fourier transformation of a function f(x) is the characteristic func-
tion of f(x), i.e. if
∫
R
|f(x)|dx < ∞, then φX(u) = E(eiuX) =
∫
R
eiuxf(x)dx.
The formula f(x) = 12π
∫
R
e−iuxφ(u)du determines the density f(x) of a random
variable X.
Fourier transform
For a and x in R and for f ◦ ψ := fψ, define the function fψa := e−axfψ(x) and
its Fourier transform by f̂ψa (ξ) :=
∫
R
e−iξxfψa (x)dx for ξ in R. Assume that f and
ψ are such that
A := { a ∈ R|fψa (·) ∈ L1(R) and f̂ψa (·) ∈ L1(R)} 6= ∅.
Then the following inversion formula holds:
fψa (x) =
1
2π
∫
R
eiξxf̂ψa (ξ)dξ, x ∈ R.
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Appendix B
Elements on fractional Brownian
motion
Most of the topic regarding the fractional Brownian motion is from [1].
Definition (Fractional Brownian Motion)
Let H be a constant belonging to (0,1). A fractional Brownian motion, fBm, (BHt )t≥0
of Hurst index H is a continuous centered Gaussian process with covariance func-
tion
E(BHt , B
H
s ) :=
1
2
(t2H + s2H − |t− s|2H), t, s ∈ R+.
A fBm has the following properties:
• BH0 = 0 and E(BHt ) = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
• BHt+s−BHt has the same distribution as BHt for s, t ≥ 0, i.e. the increments
of BH are homogeneous.
• BH is a Gaussian process and E
(
(BHt )
2
)
= t2H , t ≥ 0 for all H in (0,1).
• BH has continuous trajectories.
The covariance between (BHt+h − BHt ) and (BHs+h − BHs ) with s + h ≤ t and
t− s = nh is
ρH(n) = Cov(B
H
t+h −BHt , BHs+h −BHs ) = E
(
(BHt+h −BHt )(BHs+h −BHs )
)
= −|t− s|2H + 1
2
|t+ h− s|2H + 1
2
|t− s− h|2H
=
|h|2H
2
(
(n+ 1)2H + (n− 1)2H − 2|n|2H
)
∼ H(2H − 1)n2H−2 , n→∞
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and since
lim
n→∞
ρH(n)
H(2H − 1)n2H−2 = 1
then BHt exhibits long-range dependence for H > 12 . Two increments of the form
(BHt+h−BHt ) and (BHt+2h−BHt+h) are positively correlated for H > 12 , negatively
correlated for H < 12 and for H =
1
2 the fBm is a standard Brownian motion
which has independent increments.
For a comparison to the standard Brownian motion the following definition and
remark are from [10].
Definition (Standard, one-dimensional Brownian Motion). A one-dimensional
Brownian motion is a continuous, adapted process B = { Bt,Ft; 0 ≤ t < ∞} ,
defined on some probability space (Ω,F ,P) with the properties that B0 = 0 a.s.
and for 0 ≤ s < t, the increment (Bt − Bs) is independent of Fs and is normally
distributed with mean zero and variance (t-s).
Remark: A one-dimensional Brownian motion is a zero mean Gaussian process
with covariance
cov(Bt, Bs) = s ∧ t; s, t ≥ 0.
Some more details regarding the space Hµ([0, T ]):
If the deterministic function g is in the Schwartz space S([0, T ]), then the norm of
g is
||g||2H :=
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
g(s)g(t)H(2H − 1)|s− t|2H−1dsdt <∞.
If S([0, T ]) is equipped with the inner product
< f, g >:=
∫ T
0
∫ T
0
f(s)g(t)H(2H−1)|s− t|2H−1dsdt <∞ f, g ∈ S([0, T ]),
then the completion of S([0, T ]) is the separable Hilbert space LH2 ([0, T ]). The
space of Hölder continuous functions Hµ([0, T ]) ⊂ LH2 ([0, T ]), µ > 1 − H . In
[2], g ∈ Hµ([0, T ]).
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